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Abstract
In this paper, we consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection in the presence of Byzan-
tines in the network. It is assumed that a fraction of the nodes in the network are compromised and
reprogrammed by an adversary to transmit false information to the fusion center (FC) to degrade
detection performance. The problem of distributed detection is formulated as a binary hypothesis test at
the FC based on 1-bit data sent by the sensors. The expression for minimum attacking power required
by the Byzantines to blind the FC is obtained. More specifically, we show that above a certain fraction
of Byzantine attackers in the network, the detection scheme becomes completely incapable of utilizing
the sensor data for detection. We analyze the problem under different attacking scenarios and derive
results for different non-asymptotic cases. It is found that existing asymptotics-based results do not hold
under several non-asymptotic scenarios. When the fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the
FC, we also provide closed form expressions for the optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines that
most degrade the detection performance.
Index Terms
Bayesian detection, Data falsification, Byzantine Data, Probability of error, Distributed detection
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed detection is a well studied topic in the detection theory literature [1]–[3]. In
distributed detection systems, due to bandwidth and energy constraints, the nodes often make a
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21-bit local decision regarding the presence of a phenomenon before sending it to the fusion center
(FC). Based on the local decisions transmitted by the nodes, the FC makes a global decision about
the presence of the phenomenon of interest. Distributed detection was originally motivated by its
applications in military surveillance but is now being employed in a wide variety of applications
such as distributed spectrum sensing (DSS) using cognitive radio networks (CRNs) and traffic
and environment monitoring.
In many applications, a large number of inexpensive and less reliable nodes that can provide
dense coverage are used to provide a balance between cost and functionality. The performance of
such systems strongly depends on the reliability of the nodes in the network. The robustness of
distributed detection systems against attacks is of utmost importance. The distributed nature of
such systems makes them quite vulnerable to different types of attacks. In recent years, security
issues of such distributed networks are increasingly being studied within the networking [4],
signal processing [5] and information theory communities [6]. One typical attack on such
networks is a Byzantine attack. While Byzantine attacks (originally proposed by [7]) may, in
general, refer to many types of malicious behavior, our focus in this paper is on data-falsification
attacks [8]–[15]. In this type of attack, an attacker may send false (erroneous) data to the FC
to degrade detection performance. In this paper, we refer to such a data falsification attacker as
a Byzantine and the data thus generated is referred to as Byzantine data.
We formulate the signal detection problem as a binary hypothesis testing problem with the
two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent) and H1 (signal is present). We make the conditional i.i.d.
assumption under which observations at the nodes are conditionally independent and identically
distributed given the hypothesis. We assume that the FC is not compromised, and is able to collect
data from all the nodes in the network via error free communication channels.1 We also assume
that the FC does not know which node is Byzantine, but it knows the fraction of Byzantines in
the network.2 We consider the problem of distributed Bayesian detection with prior probabilities
of hypotheses known to both the FC and the attacker. The FC aims to minimize the probability
of error by choosing the optimal fusion rule.
1In this work, we do not consider how individual nodes deliver their data to the fusion center except that the Byzantines are
not able to alter the transmissions of honest nodes.
2In practice, the fraction of Byzantines in the network can be learned by observing the data sent by the nodes at the FC over
a time window; however, this study is beyond the scope of this work.
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3A. Related Work
Although distributed detection has been a very active field of research in the past, security
problems in distributed detection networks gained attention only very recently. In [11], the
authors considered the problem of distributed detection in the presence of Byzantines under the
Neyman-Pearson (NP) setup and determined the optimal attacking strategy which minimizes
the detection error exponent. This approach based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) is
analytically tractable and yields approximate results in non-asymptotic cases. They also assumed
that the Byzantines know the true hypothesis, which obviously is not satisfied in practice
but does provide a bound. In [12], the authors analyzed the same problem in the context of
collaborative spectrum sensing under Byzantine Attacks. They relaxed the assumption of perfect
knowledge of the hypotheses by assuming that the Byzantines determine the knowledge about
the true hypotheses from their own sensing observations. A variant of the above formulation was
explored in [13], [16], where the authors addressed the problem of optimal Byzantine attacks
(data falsification) on distributed detection for a tree-based topology and extended the results of
[12] for tree topologies. By assuming that the cost of compromising nodes at different levels
of the tree is different, they found the optimal Byzantine strategy that minimizes the cost of
attacking a given tree. Schemes for Byzantine node identification have been proposed in [12],
[15], [17], [18]. Our focus is considerably different from Byzantine node identification schemes
in that we do not try to authenticate the data; we consider most effective attacking strategies
and distributed detection schemes that are robust against attacks.
B. Main Contributions
All the approaches discussed so far consider distributed detection under the Neyman-Pearson
(NP) setup. In this paper, we consider the distributed Bayesian detection problems with known
prior probabilities of hypotheses. We assume that the Byzantines do not have perfect knowledge
about the true state of the phenomenon of interest. In addition, we also assume that the Byzantines
neither have the knowledge nor control over the thresholds used to make local decisions at the
nodes. Also, the probability of detection and the probability of false alarm of a node are assumed
to be the same for every node irrespective of whether they are honest or Byzantines. In our earlier
work [19] on this problem, we analyzed the problem in the asymptotic regime. Adopting Chernoff
information as our performance metric, we studied the performance of a distributed detection
DRAFT
4TABLE I
DIFFERENT SCENARIOS BASED ON THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OPPONENT’S STRATEGIES
Cases Attacker has the knowledge of the FC’s strategies FC has the knowledge of Attacker’s strategies
Case 1 No No
Case 2 Yes No
Case 3 Yes Yes
Case 4 No Yes
system with Byzantines in the asymptotic regime. We summarize our results in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1 ( [19]). Optimal attacking strategies, (P ∗1,0, P ∗0,1), which minimize the Chernoff
information are
(P ∗1,0, P
∗
0,1)
 (p1,0, p0,1) if α ≥ 0.5(1, 1) if α < 0.5 ,
where, (p1,0, p0,1) satisfy α(p1,0 + p0,1) = 1.
In our current work, we significantly extend our previous work and focus on a non-asymptotic
analysis for the Byzantine attacks on distributed Bayesian detection. First, we show that above
a certain fraction of Byzantines in the network, the data fusion scheme becomes completely
incapable (blind) and it is not possible to design a decision rule at the FC that can perform
better than the decision rule based just on prior information. We find the minimum fraction of
Byzantines that can blind the FC and refer to it as the critical power. Next, we explore the
optimal attacking strategies for the Byzantines under different scenarios. In practice, the FC
and the Byzantines will optimize their utility by choosing their actions based on the knowledge
of their opponent’s behavior. This motivates us to address the question: what are the optimal
attacking/defense strategies given the knowledge of the opponent’s strategies? Study of these
practically motivated questions requires non asymptotic analysis, which is systematically studied
in this work. By assuming the error probability to be our performance metric, we analyze the
problem in the non asymptotic regime. Observe that, the probability of error is a function of the
fusion rule, which is under the control of the FC. This gives us an additional degree of freedom to
analyze the Byzantine attack under different practical scenarios where the FC and the Byzantines
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5may or may not have knowledge of their opponent’s strategies (For a description of different
scenarios see Table I). It is found that results based on asymptotics do not hold under several
non-asymptotic scenarios. More specifically, when the FC does not have knowledge of attacker’s
strategies, results for the non-asymptotic case are different from those for the asymptotic case.
However, if the FC has complete knowledge of the attacker’s strategies and uses the optimal
fusion rule to make the global decision, results obtained for this case are the same as those for the
asymptotic case. Knowledge of the behavior of the attacker in the non-asymptotic regime enables
the analysis of many related questions, such as the design of the optimal detector (fusion rule)
and effects of strategic interaction between the FC and the attacker. In the process of analyzing
the scenario where the FC has complete knowledge of its opponent’s strategies, we obtain a
closed form expression of the optimal fusion rule. To summarize, our main contributions are
threefold.
• In contrast to previous works, we study the problem of distributed detection with Byzantine
data in the Bayesian framework.
• We analyze the problem under different attacking scenarios and derive closed form expres-
sions for optimal attacking strategies for different non-asymptotic cases.
• In the process of analyzing the scenario where the FC has complete knowledge of its
opponent’s strategies, we obtain a closed form expression for the optimal fusion rule.
The signal processing problem considered in this paper is closest to [12]. The approach in [12],
based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD), is analytically tractable and yields approximate
results in non-asymptotic cases. Our results, however, are not a direct application of those of [12].
While as in [12] we are also interested in the optimal attack strategies, our objective function
and, therefore, techniques of finding them are different. In contrast to [12], where only optimal
strategies to blind the FC were obtained, we also provide closed form expressions for the optimal
attacking strategies for the Byzantines that most degrade the detection performance when the
fraction of Byzantines is not sufficient to blind the FC. In fact, finding the optimal Byzantine
attacking strategies is only the first step toward designing a robust distributed detection system.
Knowledge of these attacking strategies can be used to implement the optimal detector at the FC
or to implement an efficient reputation based identification scheme [12], [20] ( thresholds in these
schemes are generally a function of attack strategies). Also, the optimal attacking distributions
DRAFT
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Fig. 1. System Model
in certain cases have the minimax property and, therefore, the knowledge of these optimal attack
strategies can be used to implement the robust detector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces our system model, including
the Byzantine attack model. In Section III, we provide the closed form expression for the critical
power above which the FC becomes blind. Next, we discuss our results based on non-asymptotic
analysis of the distributed Bayesian detection system with Byzantine data for different scenarios.
In Section IV, we analyze the problem when Byzantines do not have any knowledge about the
fusion rule used at the FC. Section V discusses the scenario where Byzantines have the knowledge
about the fusion rule used at the FC, but the FC does not know the attacker’s strategies. Next in
Section VI, we extend our analysis to the scenario where both the FC and the attacker have the
knowledge of their opponent’s strategies and act strategically to optimize their utilities. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. DISTRIBUTED DETECTION IN THE PRESENCE OF BYZANTINES
Consider two hypotheses H0 (signal is absent) and H1 (signal is present). Also, consider
a parallel network (see Figure 1), comprised of a central entity (known as the Fusion Center
(FC)) and a set of N sensors (nodes), which faces the task of determining which of the two
hypotheses is true. Prior probabilities of the two hypotheses H0 and H1 are denoted by P0 and
P1, respectively. The sensors observe the phenomenon, carry out local computations to decide
the presence or absence of the phenomenon, and then send their local decisions to the FC that
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7yields a final decision after processing the local decisions. Observations at the nodes are assumed
to be conditionally independent and identically distributed given the hypothesis. A Byzantine
attack on such a system compromises some of the nodes which may then intentionally send
falsified local decisions to the FC to make the final decision incorrect. We assume that a fraction
α of the N nodes which observe the phenomenon have been compromised by an attacker. We
consider the communication channels to be error-free. Next, we describe the modus operandi of
the sensors and the FC in detail.
A. Modus Operandi of the Nodes
Based on the observations, each node i makes a one-bit local decision vi ∈ {0, 1} regarding
the absence or presence of the phenomenon using the likelihood ratio test
p
(1)
Y i (yi)
p
(0)
Y i (yi)
vi=1
≷
vi=0
λ, (1)
where λ is the identical threshold3 used at all the sensors and p(k)Y i (yi) is the conditional probability
density function (PDF) of observation yi under the hypothesis Hk. Each node i, after making its
one-bit local decision vi, sends ui ∈ {0, 1} to the FC, where ui = vi if i is an uncompromised
(honest) node, but for a compromised (Byzantine) node i, ui need not be equal to vi. We
denote the probabilities of detection and false alarm of each node i in the network by Pd =
P (vi = 1|H1) and Pf = P (vi = 1|H0), respectively, which hold for both uncompromised
nodes as well as compromised nodes. In this paper, we assume that each Byzantine decides to
attack independently relying on its own observation and decision regarding the presence of the
phenomenon. Specifically, we define the following strategies PHj,1, P
H
j,0 and P
B
j,1, P
B
j,0 (j ∈ {0, 1})
for the honest and Byzantine nodes, respectively:
Honest nodes:
PH1,1 = 1− PH0,1 = PH(x = 1|y = 1) = 1 (2)
PH1,0 = 1− PH0,0 = PH(x = 1|y = 0) = 0 (3)
Byzantine nodes:
PB1,1 = 1− PB0,1 = PB(x = 1|y = 1) (4)
3It has been shown that the use of identical thresholds is asymptotically optimal [21].
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8PB1,0 = 1− PB0,0 = PB(x = 1|y = 0) (5)
PH(x = a|y = b) (PB(x = a|y = b)) is the probability that an honest (Byzantine) node sends
a to the FC when its actual local decision is b. From now onwards, we will refer to Byzantine
flipping probabilities simply by (P1,0, P0,1). We also assume that the FC is not aware of the exact
set of Byzantine nodes and considers each node i to be Byzantine with a certain probability α.
B. Binary Hypothesis Testing at the Fusion Center
We consider a Bayesian detection problem where the performance criterion at the FC is the
probability of error. The FC receives decision vector, u = [u1, · · · , uN ], from the nodes and
makes the global decision about the phenomenon by considering the maximum a posteriori
probability (MAP) rule which is given by
P (H1|u)
H1
≷
H0
P (H0|u)
or equivalently,
P (u|H1)
P (u|H0)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
.
Since the uis are independent of each other, the MAP rule simplifies to a K-out-of-N fusion
rule [1]. The global false alarm probability QF and detection probability QD are then given by4
QF =
N∑
i=K
 N
i
 (pi1,0)i(1− pi1,0)N−i (6)
and
QD =
N∑
i=K
 N
i
 (pi1,1)i(1− pi1,1)N−i, (7)
where pij0 and pij1 are the conditional probabilities of ui = j given H0 and H1, respectively.
Specifically, pi1,0 and pi1,1 can be calculated as
pi1,0 = α(P1,0(1− Pf ) + (1− P0,1)Pf ) + (1− α)Pf (8)
4These expressions are valid under the assumption that α < 0.5. Later in Section VI, we will generalize our result for any
arbitrary α.
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9and
pi1,1 = α(P1,0(1− Pd) + (1− P0,1)Pd) + (1− α)Pd, (9)
where α is the fraction of Byzantine nodes.
The local probability of error as seen by the FC is defined as
Pe = P0pi1,0 + P1 (1− pi1,1) (10)
and the system wide probability of error at the FC is given by
PE = P0QF + P1 (1−QD) . (11)
Notice that, the system wide probability of error PE is a function of the parameter K, which
is under the control of the FC, and the parameters (α, Pj,0, Pj,1) are under the control of the
attacker.
The FC and the Byzantines may or may not have knowledge of their opponent’s strategy. We
will analyze the problem of detection with Byzantine data under several different scenarios in
the following sections. First, we will determine the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to
blind the decision fusion scheme.
III. CRITICAL POWER TO BLIND THE FUSION CENTER
In this section, we determine the minimum fraction of Byzantine nodes needed to make the
FC “blind” and denote it by αblind. We say that the FC is blind if an adversary can make the
data that the FC receives from the sensors such that no information is conveyed. In other words,
the optimal detector at the FC cannot perform better than simply making the decision based on
priors.
Lemma 1. In Bayesian distributed detection, the minimum fraction of Byzantines needed to
make the FC blind is αblind = 0.5.
Proof: In the Bayesian framework, we say that the FC is “blind”, if the received data u
does not provide any information about the hypotheses to the FC. That is, the condition to make
the FC blind can be stated as
P (Hi|u) = P (Hi) for i = 0, 1. (12)
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It can be seen that (12) is equivalent to
P (Hi|u) = P (Hi)
⇔ P (Hi)P (u|Hi)
P (u)
= P (Hi)
⇔ P (u|Hi) = P (u).
Thus, the FC becomes blind if the probability of receiving a given vector u is independent
of the hypothesis present. In such a scenario, the best that the FC can do is to make decisions
solely based on the priors, resulting in the most degraded performance at the FC. Now, using the
conditional i.i.d. assumption, under which observations at the nodes are conditionally independent
and identically distributed given the hypothesis, condition (12) to make the FC blind becomes
pi1,1 = pi1,0. This is true only when
α[P1,0(Pf − Pd) + (1− P0,1)(Pd − Pf )] + (1− α)(Pd − Pf ) = 0.
Hence, the FC becomes blind if
α =
1
(P1,0 + P0,1)
. (13)
α in (13) is minimized when P1,0 and P0,1 both take their largest values, i.e., P1,0 = P0,1 = 1.
Hence, αblind = 0.5.
Next, we investigate how the Byzantines can launch an attack optimally considering that
the parameter (K) is under the control of the FC. By assuming error probability to be our
performance metric, we analyze the non-asymptotic regime. Observe that the probability of
error is dependent on the fusion rule. This gives us an additional degree of freedom to analyze
the Byzantine attack under different scenarios where the FC and the Byzantines may or may not
have knowledge of their opponent’s strategies.
IV. OPTIMAL ATTACKING STRATEGIES WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF FUSION RULE
In practice, the Byzantine attacker may not have the knowledge about the fusion rule, i.e.,
the value of K, used by the FC. In such scenarios, we obtain the optimal attacking strategy for
Byzantines by maximizing the local probability of error as seen by the FC, which is independent
of the fusion rule K. We formally state the problem as
DRAFT
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TABLE II
SOULTION OF MAXIMIZING LOCAL ERROR Pe PROBLEM
P1,0 P0,1 Condition
0 0 Pd
Pf
< P0
P1
< 1−Pd
1−Pf
0 1 Pd
Pf
> P0
P1
< 1−Pd
1−Pf
1 0 Pd
Pf
< P0
P1
> 1−Pd
1−Pf
1 1 Pd
Pf
> P0
P1
> 1−Pd
1−Pf
maximize
P1,0,P0,1
P0pi1,0 + P1(1− pi1,1)
subject to 0 ≤ P1,0 ≤ 1
0 ≤ P0,1 ≤ 1
(P1)
To solve the problem, we analyze the properties of the objective function, Pe = P0pi1,0+P1(1−
pi1,1), with respect to (P1,0, P0,1). Notice that
dPe
P1,0
= P0α(1− Pf )− P1α(1− Pd) (14)
and
dPe
P0,1
= −P0αPf + P1αPd. (15)
By utilizing monotonicity properties of the objective function with respect to P1,0 and P0,1 ((14)
and (15)), we present the solution of the Problem P1 in Table II. Notice that, when Pd
Pf
< P0
P1
<
1−Pd
1−Pf , both (14) and (15) are less than zero. Pe then becomes a strictly decreasing function of
P1,0 as well as P0,1. Hence, to maximize Pe, the attacker needs to choose (P1,0, P0,1) = (0, 0).
However, the condition Pd
Pf
< P0
P1
< 1−Pd
1−Pf holds iff Pd < Pf and, therefore, is not admissible.
Similar arguments lead to the rest of results given in Table II. Note that, if there is an equality
in the conditions mentioned in Table II, then the solution will not be unique. For example,(
dPe
P0,1
= 0
)
⇔
(
P0
P1
=
1− Pd
1− Pf
)
implies that the Pe is constant as a function of P0,1. In other
words, the attacker will be indifferent in choosing the parameter P0,1 because any value of P0,1
will result in the same probability of error.
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Fig. 2. (a) Pe as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) when P0 = P1 = 0.5. (b) Pe as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) when P0 = 0.1, P1 = 0.9.
Next, to gain insight into the solution, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our
results.
A. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 2(a), we plot the local probability of error Pe as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) when
(P0 = P1 = 0.5). We assume that the local probability of detection is Pd = 0.8 and the local
probability of false alarm is Pf = 0.1 such that PdPf = 8,
1−Pd
1−Pf = .2222, and
P0
P1
= 1. Clearly,
Pd
Pf
> P0
P1
> 1−Pd
1−Pf and it implies that the optimal attacking strategy is (P1,0, P0,1) = (1, 1), which
can be verified from Figure 2(a).
In Figure 2(b), we study the local probability of error Pe as a function of the attacking strategy
(P1,0, P0,1) when (P0 = 0.1, P1 = 0.9). We assume that the local probability of detection is
Pd = 0.8 and the local probability of false alarm is Pf = 0.1 such that PdPf = 8,
1−Pd
1−Pf =
.2222, and P0
P1
= .1111. Clearly, Pd
Pf
> P0
P1
< 1−Pd
1−Pf implies that the optimal attacking strategy is
(P1,0, P0,1) = (0, 1), which can be verified from the Figure 2(b). These results corroborate our
theoretical results presented in Table II.
In the next section, we investigate the scenario where Byzantines are aware of the fusion
rule K used at the FC and can use this knowledge to provide false information in an optimal
manner to blind the FC. However, the FC does not have knowledge of Byzantine’s attacking
strategies (α, Pj,0, Pj,1) and does not optimize against Byzantine’s behavior. Since majority rule
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is a widely used fusion rule [14], [22], [23], we assume that the FC uses the majority rule to
make the global decision.
V. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACKING STRATEGIES WITH KNOWLEDGE OF MAJORITY
FUSION RULE
In this section, we investigate optimal Byzantine attacking strategies in a distributed detection
system, with the attacker having knowledge about the fusion rule used at the FC. However, we
assume that the FC is not strategic in nature, and uses a majority rule, without trying to optimize
against the Byzantine’s behavior. We consider both the FC and the Byzantine to be strategic in
Section VI. The performance criterion at the FC is assumed to be the probability of error PE .
For a fixed fusion rule (K∗), which, as mentioned before, is assumed to be the majority rule
K∗ = dN+1
2
e, PE varies with the parameters (α, Pj,0, Pj,1) which are under the control of the
attacker. The Byzantine attack problem can be formally stated as follows:
maximize
Pj,0,Pj,1
PE(α, Pj,0, Pj,1)
subject to 0 ≤ Pj,0 ≤ 1
0 ≤ Pj,1 ≤ 1.
(P2)
For a fixed fraction of Byzantines α, the attacker wants to maximize the probability of error PE
by choosing its attacking strategy (Pj,0, Pj,1) optimally. We assume that the attacker is aware of
the fact that the FC is using the majority rule for making the global decision. Before presenting
our main results for Problem P2, we make an assumption that will be used in the theorem.
Assumption 1. We assume that α < min{(0.5− Pf ), (1− (m/Pd))},5 where m = N2N−2 .
A consequence of this assumption is pi1,1 > m, which can be shown as follows. By (9), we
5Condition α < min{(0.5−Pf ), (1−(m/Pd))}, where m = N2N−2 > 0.5, suggests that as N tends to infinity, m =
N
2N − 2
tends to 0.5. When Pd tends to 1 and Pf tends to 0, the above condition becomes α < 0.5.
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have
pi1,1 = α(P1,0(1− Pd) + (1− P0,1)Pd) + (1− α)Pd
= αP1,0(1− Pd)− αPdP0,1 + Pd
≥ −αPdP0,1 + Pd ≥ Pd(1− α) > m. (16)
Eq. (16) is true because α < min{(0.5 − Pf ), (1 − (m/Pd))} ≤ (1 − (m/Pd)). Another
consequence of this assumption is pi1,0 < 0.5, which can be shown as follows. From (8), we
have
pi1,0 = α(P1,0(1− Pf ) + (1− P0,1)Pf ) + (1− α)Pf
= αP1,0 − αPf (P1,0 + P0,1) + Pf
≤ α + Pf < 0.5. (17)
Eq. (17) is true because α < min{(0.5− Pf ), (1− (m/Pd))} ≤ (0.5− Pf ).
Next, we analyze the properties of PE with respect to (P1,0, P0,1) under our assumption that
enable us to find the optimal attacking strategies.
Lemma 2. Assume that the FC employs the majority fusion rule K∗ and α < min{(0.5 −
Pf ), (1 − (m/Pd))}, where m = N2N−2 . Then, for any fixed value of P0,1, the error probability
PE at the FC is a quasi-convex function of P1,0.
Proof: A function f(P1,0) is quasi-convex if, for some P ∗1,0, f(P1,0) is non-increasing for
P1,0 ≤ P ∗1,0 and f(P1,0) is non-decreasing for P1,0 ≥ P ∗1,0. In other words, the lemma is proved
if
dPE
dP1,0
≤ 0 (or dPE
dP1,0
≥ 0) for all P1,0, or if for some P ∗1,0,
dPE
dP1,0
≤ 0 when P1,0 ≤ P ∗1,0 and
dPE
dP1,0
≥ 0 when P1,0 ≥ P ∗1,0. First, we calculate the partial derivative of PE with respect to P1,0
for an arbitrary K as follows:
dPE
dP1,0
= P0
dQF
dP1,0
− P1 dQD
dP1,0
. (18)
The detailed derivation of
dPE
dP1,0
is given in Appendix B and we present a summary of the main
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results below.
dQF
dP1,0
= α(1− Pf )N
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,0)K−1 (1− pi1,0)N−K , (19)
dQD
dP1,0
= α(1− Pd)N
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,1)K−1 (1− pi1,1)N−K , (20)
and
dPE
dP1,0
= −P1α(1− Pd)N
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,1)K−1 (1− pi1,1)N−K
+ P0α(1− Pf )N
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,0)K−1 (1− pi1,0)N−K . (21)
dPE
dP1,0
given in (21) can be reformulated as follows:
dPE
dP1,0
= g (P1,0, K, α)
(
er(P1,0,K,α) − 1) , (22)
where
g (P1,0, K, α) = N
 N − 1
K − 1
P1α(1− Pd)(pi1,1)K−1(1− pi1,1)N−K (23)
and
r (P1,0, K, α) = ln
(
P0
P1
1− Pf
1− Pd
(
pi1,0
pi1,1
)(K−1)(
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
)(N−K))
= ln
P0
P1
1− Pf
1− Pd + (K − 1) ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
+ (N −K) ln 1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 . (24)
It can be seen that g (P1,0, K, α) ≥ 0 so that the sign of dPEdP1,0 depends only on the value
of r (P1,0, K, α). To prove that PE is a quasi-convex function of P1,0 when the majority rule
K∗ is used at the FC, it is sufficient to show that r (P1,0, K∗, α) is a non-decreasing function.
Differentiating r (P1,0, K∗, α) with respect to P1,0, we get
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
= (K∗−1)
(
α(1− Pf )
pi1,0
− α(1− Pd)
pi1,1
)
+(N−K∗)
(
α(1− Pd)
1− pi1,1 −
α(1− Pf )
1− pi1,0
)
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= (K∗ − 1)α
(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
− (N −K∗)α
(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
. (25)
It can be shown that
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
> 0 (see Appendix A) and this completes the proof.
Quasi-convexity of PE over P1,0 implies that the maximum of the function occurs on the
corners, i.e., P1,0 = 0 or 1 (may not be unique). Next, we analyze the properties of PE with
respect to P0,1.
Lemma 3. Assume that the FC employs the majority fusion rule K∗ and α < min{(0.5 −
Pf ), (1− (m/Pd))}, where m = N2N−2 . Then, the probability of error PE at the FC is a quasi-
convex function of P0,1 for a fixed P1,0.
Proof: For a fixed P1,0, we have
(pi1,0)
′ = dpi1,0/dP0,1 = α(−Pf ). (26)
By a similar argument as given in Appendix B, for an arbitrary K we have
dPE
dP0,1
= P1αPdN
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,1)K−1 (1− pi1,1)N−K
− P0αPfN
 N − 1
K − 1
 (pi1,0)K−1 (1− pi1,0)N−K . (27)
dPE
dP0,1
given in (27) can be reformulated as follows:
dPE
dP0,1
= g (P0,1, K, α)
(
er(P0,1,K,α) − 1) , (28)
where
g (P0,1, K, α) = N
 N − 1
K − 1
P0αPf (pi1,0)K−1(1− pi1,0)N−K (29)
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and
r (P0,1, K, α) = ln
(
P1
P0
Pd
Pf
(
pi1,1
pi1,0
)(K−1)(
1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0
)(N−K))
= ln
P1
P0
Pd
Pf
+ (K − 1) ln pi1,1
pi1,0
+ (N −K) ln 1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0 . (30)
It can be seen that g (P0,1, K, α) ≥ 0 such that the sign of dPE
dP0,1
depends on the value of
r (P0,1, K, α). To prove that PE is a quasi-convex function of P1,0 when the majority rule K∗
is used at the FC, it is sufficient to show that r (P0,1, K∗, α) is a non-decreasing function.
Differentiating r (P0,1, K∗, α) with respect to P0,1, we get
dr (P0,1, K
∗, α)
dP0,1
= (K∗ − 1)
(
αPf
pi1,0
− αPd
pi1,1
)
+ (N −K∗)
(
αPd
1− pi1,1 −
αPf
1− pi1,0
)
(31)
= (N −K∗)α
(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
− (K∗ − 1)α
(
Pd
pi1,1
− Pf
pi1,0
)
. (32)
In the following, we show that
dr (P0,1, K
∗, α)
dP0,1
> 0, (33)
i.e., r (P0,1, K∗, α) is non-decreasing. It is sufficient to show that
(N −K∗)
(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
> (K∗ − 1)
(
Pd
pi1,1
− Pf
pi1,0
)
. (34)
First, we consider the case when there are an even number of nodes in the network and majority
fusion rule is given by K∗ =
N
2
+ 1. Since 0 ≤ pi1,0 < pi1,1 ≤ 1 and N ≥ 2, we have(
1− 2
N
)
pi1,1pi1,0
(1− pi1,1)(1− pi1,0) > −1
⇔
(
1− 2
N
)[
1
1− pi1,1 −
1
1− pi1,0
]
>
[
1
pi1,1
− 1
pi1,0
]
⇔
[(
1− 2
N
)
1
1− pi1,1 −
1
pi1,1
]
>
[(
1− 2
N
)
1
1− pi1,0 −
1
pi1,0
]
. (35)
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Using the fact that
Pd
Pf
> 1, pi1,1 > N2N−2 , and K
∗ =
N
2
+ 1, (35) becomes
Pd
Pf
[(
1− 2
N
)
1
1− pi1,1 −
1
pi1,1
]
>
[(
1− 2
N
)
1
1− pi1,0 −
1
pi1,0
]
⇔
(
1− 2
N
)
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pd
pi1,1
>
(
1− 2
N
)
Pf
1− pi1,0 −
Pf
pi1,0
⇔ (N −K∗)
(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
> (K∗ − 1)
(
Pd
pi1,1
− Pf
pi1,0
)
. (36)
Next, we consider the case when there are odd number of nodes in the network and majority
fusion rule is given by K∗ =
N + 1
2
. By using the fact that pi1,0
pi1,1
>
Pf
Pd
, it can be seen that the
right-hand side of (36) is nonnegative. Hence, from (36), we have(
N
2
− 1
)(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
>
N
2
(
Pd
pi1,1
− Pf
pi1,0
)
⇔
(
N − 1
2
)(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
>
(
N − 1
2
)(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
⇔ (N −K∗)
(
Pd
1− pi1,1 −
Pf
1− pi1,0
)
> (K∗ − 1)
(
Pd
pi1,1
− Pf
pi1,0
)
.
This completes our proof.
Theorem 2. (1, 0), (0, 1), or (1, 1) are the optimal attacking strategies (P1,0, P0,1) that maximize
the probability of error PE , when the majority fusion rule is employed at the FC and α <
min{(0.5− Pf ), (1− (m/Pd))}, where m = N2N−2 .
Proof: Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 suggest that one of the corners is the maximum of PE
because of quasi-convexity. Note that (0, 0) cannot be the solution of the maximization problem
since the attacker does not flip any results. Hence, we end up with three possibilities: (1, 0),
(0, 1), or (1, 1).
Next, to gain insights into Theorem 2, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our
results.
A. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 3(a), we plot the probability of error PE as a function of the attacking strategy
(P1,0, P0,1) for even number of nodes, N = 10, in the network. We assume that the probability
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Fig. 3. (a) PE as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for N = 10. (b) PE as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for N = 11.
of detection is Pd = 0.8, the probability of false alarm is Pf = 0.1, prior probabilities are
(P0 = 0.4, P1 = 0.6), and α = 0.37. Since α < min{(0.5−Pf ), (1−(m/Pd))}, where m = N2N−2 ,
quasi-convexity can be observed in Figure 3(a). Figure 3(b) shows the probability of error PE as
a function of attacking strategy (P1,0, P0,1) for odd number of nodes, N = 11, in the network.
Similarly, quasi-convexity can be observed in Figure 3(b).
It is evident from Figures 3(a) and 3(b) that the optimal attacking strategy (P1,0, P0,1) is
either of the following three possibilities: (1, 0), (0, 1), or (1, 1). These results corroborate our
theoretical results presented in Theorem 2.
Observe that the results obtained for this case are not the same as the results obtained for the
asymptotic case (Please see Theorem 1). This is because the asymptotic performance measure
(i.e., Chernoff information) is the exponential decay rate of the error probability of the “optimal
detector”. In other words, while optimizing over Chernoff information, one implicitly assumed
that the optimal fusion rule is used at the FC.
Next, we investigate the case where the FC has the knowledge of attacker’s strategies and uses
the optimal fusion rule K∗ to make the global decision. Here, the attacker tries to maximize its
worst case probability of error min
K
PE by choosing (P1,0, P0,1) optimally.
VI. OPTIMAL BYZANTINE ATTACKING STRATEGIES WITH STRATEGY-AWARE FC
In this section, we analyze the scenario where the FC has the knowledge of attacker’s strategies
and uses the optimal fusion rule K∗ to make the global decision. The Byzantine attack problem
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can be formally stated as follows:
maximize
Pj,0,Pj,1
PE(K
∗, α, Pj,0, Pj,1)
subject to 0 ≤ Pj,0 ≤ 1
0 ≤ Pj,1 ≤ 1,
(P3)
where K∗ is the optimal fusion rule. In other words, K∗ is the best response of the FC to the
Byzantine attacking strategies. Next, we find the expression for the optimal fusion rule K∗ used
at the FC.
A. Optimal Fusion Rule
First, we design the optimal fusion rule assuming that the local sensor threshold λ and the
Byzantine attacking strategy (α, P1,0, P0,1) are fixed and known to the FC.
Lemma 4. For a fixed local sensor threshold λ and α <
1
P0,1 + P1,0
, the optimal fusion rule is
given by
K∗
H1
≷
H0
ln
[
(P0/P1) {(1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1)}N
]
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] . (37)
Proof: Consider the maximum a posteriori probability (MAP) rule
P (u|H1)
P (u|H0)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
.
Since the uis are independent of each other, the MAP rule simplifies to
N∏
i=1
P (ui|H1)
P (ui|H0)
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
.
Let us assume that K∗ out of N nodes send ui = 1. Now, the above equation can be written as
piK
∗
1,1 (1− pi1,1)N−K∗
piK
∗
1,0 (1− pi1,0)N−K∗
H1
≷
H0
P0
P1
.
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Taking logarithms on both sides of the above equation, we have
K∗ lnpi1,1 + (N −K∗) ln(1− pi1,1)−K∗ lnpi1,0 − (N −K∗) ln(1− pi1,0)
H1
≷
H0
ln
P0
P1
⇔ K∗[ln(pi1,1/pi1,0) + ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))]
H1
≷
H0
ln
P0
P1
+N ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
⇔ K∗
H1
≷
H0
ln
P0
P1
+N ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))
[ln(pi1,1/pi1,0) + ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))] (38)
⇔ K∗
H1
≷
H0
ln
[
(P0/P1) {(1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1)}N
]
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] ,
where (38) follows from the fact that, for pi1,1 > pi1,0 or equivalently, α <
1
P0,1 + P1,0
, [ln(pi1,1/pi1,0)+
ln((1− pi1,0)/(1− pi1,1))] > 0.
The probability of false alarm QF and the probability of detection QD for this case are as
given in (6) and (7) with K = dK∗e. Next, we present our results for the case when the fraction
of Byzantines α >
1
P0,1 + P1,0
.
Lemma 5. For a fixed local sensor threshold λ and α >
1
P0,1 + P1,0
, the optimal fusion rule is
given by
K∗
H0
≷
H1
ln
[
(P1/P0) {(1− pi1,1)/(1− pi1,0)}N
]
[ln(pi1,0/pi1,1) + ln((1− pi1,1)/(1− pi1,0))] . (39)
Proof: This can be proved similarly as Lemma 4 and using the fact that, for pi1,1 < pi1,0 or
equivalently, α >
1
P0,1 + P1,0
, [ln(pi1,0/pi1,1) + ln((1− pi1,1)/(1− pi1,0))] > 0.
The probability of false alarm QF and the probability of detection QD for this case can be
calculated to be
QF =
bK∗c∑
i=0
 N
i
 (pi1,0)i(1− pi1,0)N−i (40)
and
QD =
bK∗c∑
i=0
 N
i
 (pi1,1)i(1− pi1,1)N−i. (41)
Next, we analyze the property of PE with respect to Byzantine attacking strategy (P1,0, P0,1)
that enables us to find the optimal attacking strategies.
DRAFT
22
Lemma 6. For a fixed local sensor threshold λ, assume that the FC employs the optimal
fusion rule dK∗e, 6 as given in (37). Then, for α ≤ 0.5, the error probability PE at the FC
is a monotonically increasing function of P1,0 while P0,1 remains fixed. Conversely, the error
probability PE at the FC is a monotonically increasing function of P0,1 while P1,0 remains fixed.
Proof: Observe that, for a fixed λ, PE(dK∗e) is a continuous but not a differentiable function.
However, the function is non differentiable only at a finite number (or infinitely countable
number) of points because of the nature of dK∗e. Now observe that, for a fixed fusion rule
K, PE(K) is differentiable. Utilizing this fact, to show that the lemma is true, we first find the
condition that a fusion rule K should satisfy so that PE is a monotonically increasing function of
P1,0 while keeping P0,1 fixed (and vice versa) and later show that dK∗e satisfies this condition.
From (22), finding those K that satisfy
dPE
dP1,0
> 07 is equivalent to finding those value of K
that make
r (P1,0, K, α) > 0
⇔ ln P0
P1
1− Pf
1− Pd + (K − 1) ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
+ (N −K) ln 1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1 > 0
⇔ K <
ln
P0
P1
+N ln
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1) + ln
1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] . (42)
Similarly, we can find the condition that a fusion rule K should satisfy so that PE is a mono-
tonically increasing function of P0,1 while keeping P1,0 fixed. From (28), finding those K that
satisfy
dPE
dP0,1
> 0 is equivalent to finding those K that make
r (P0,1, K, α) > 0
⇔ ln P1
P0
Pd
Pf
+ (K − 1) ln pi1,1
pi1,0
+ (N −K) ln 1− pi1,1
1− pi1,0 > 0
⇔ K >
ln
P0
P1
+N ln
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1) + ln
Pf
Pd
− ln pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] . (43)
From (42) and (43), we have
6Notice that, K∗ might not be an integer.
7Observe that, for α < 0.5, the function g (P1,0,K∗, α) = 0 (as given in (23)) only under extreme conditions (i.e., P1 = 0
or Pd = 0 or Pd = 1). Ignoring these extreme conditions, we have g (P1,0,K∗, α) > 0.
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A =
ln
P0
P1
+N ln
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1) + ln
1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] > K >
ln
P0
P1
+N ln
(1− pi1,0)
(1− pi1,1) + ln
Pf
Pd
− ln pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] = B.
(44)
Next, we show that the optimal fusion rule dK∗e given in (37) is within the region (A,B). First
we prove that dK∗e > B by showing K∗ > B. Comparing K∗ given in (37) with B, K∗ > B
iff
0 > ln
Pf
Pd
− ln pi1,0
pi1,1
. (45)
Since Pd > Pf , to prove (45) we start from the inequality
(1− Pd)
Pd
<
(1− Pf )
Pf
⇔ αP1,0(1− Pd) + Pd(1− P0,1α)
Pd
<
αP1,0(1− Pf ) + Pf (1− P0,1α)
Pf
⇔ pi1,1
Pd
<
pi1,0
Pf
⇔ 0 > ln Pf
Pd
− ln pi1,0
pi1,1
.
Now, we show that A > dK∗e. Observe that,
A > dK∗e
⇔
ln
1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] > dK
∗e −K∗.
Hence, it is sufficient to show that
ln
1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] > 1 > dK
∗e −K∗.
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1 > dK∗e −K∗ is true from the property of the ceiling function. By (55), we have
1− Pf
1− Pd >
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
⇔ ln 1− Pf
1− Pd > ln
1− pi1,0
1− pi1,1
⇔ ln 1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
> ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}]
⇔
ln
1− Pf
1− Pd − ln
pi1,0
pi1,1
ln [{pi1,1(1− pi1,0)}/{pi1,0(1− pi1,1)}] > 1
which completes the proof.
Based on Lemma 6, we present the optimal attacking strategies for the case when the FC has
the knowledge regarding the strategies used by the Byzantines.
Theorem 3. The optimal attacking strategies, (P ∗1,0, P ∗0,1), which maximize the probability of
error, PE(dK∗e), are given by
(P ∗1,0, P
∗
0,1)
 (p1,0, p0,1) if α > 0.5(1, 1) if α ≤ 0.5
where (p1,0, p0,1) satisfies α(p1,0 + p0,1) = 1.
Proof: Note that, the maximum probability of error occurs when the posterior probabilities
are equal to the prior probabilities of the hypotheses. That is,
P (Hi|u) = P (Hi) for i = 0, 1. (46)
Now using the result from (13), the condition can be simplified to
α(P1,0 + P0,1) = 1. (47)
Eq. (47) suggests that when α ≥ 0.5, the attacker can find flipping probabilities that make
PE = min{P0, P1}. When α = 0.5, P1,0 = P0,1 = 1 is the optimal attacking strategy and when
α > 0.5, any pair which satisfies P1,0 + P0,1 =
1
α
is optimal. However, when α < 0.5, (47)
cannot be satisfied. In this case, by Lemma 6, for α < 0.5, (1, 1) is an optimal attacking strategy,
(P1,0, P0,1), which maximizes probability of error, PE(dK∗e).
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Fig. 4. Minimum probability of error (minK PE) analysis. (a) minK PE as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for α = 0.4. (b) minK PE
as a function of (P1,0, P0,1) for α = 0.8.
Next, to gain insight into Theorem 3, we present illustrative examples that corroborate our
results.
B. Illustrative Examples
In Figure 4, we plot the minimum probability of error as a function of attacker’s strategy
(P1,0, P0,1), where PE is minimized over all possible fusion rules K. We consider a N = 11 node
network, with the nodes’ detection and false alarm probabilities being 0.6 and 0.4, respectively.
Prior probabilities are assumed to be P0 = 0.4 and P1 = 0.6. Observe that, the optimal
fusion rule as given in (37) changes with attacker’s strategy (P1,0, P0,1). Thus, the minimum
probability of error minK PE is a non-differentiable function. It is evident from Figure 4(a)
that (P1,0, P0,1) = (1, 1) maximizes the probability of error, PE(dK∗e). This corroborates our
theoretical results presented in Theorem 3, that for α < 0.5, the optimal attacking strategy,
(P1,0, P0,1), that maximizes the probability of error, PE(dK∗e), is (1, 1).
In Figure 4(b) we consider the scenario where α = 0.8 (i.e., α > 0.5). It can be seen that
the attacking strategy (P1,0, P0,1), that maximizes minK PE is not unique in this case. It can
be verified that any attacking strategy which satisfies P1,0 + P0,1 = 10.8 will make minK PE =
min{P0, P1} = 0.4. This corroborates our theoretical results presented in Theorem 3.
Observe that the results obtained for this case are consistent with the results obtained for the
asymptotic case. This is because the optimal fusion rule is used at the FC and the asymptotic
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performance measure (i.e., Chernoff information) is the exponential decay rate of error probability
of the “optimal detector”, and thus, implicitly assumes that the optimal fusion rule is used at
the FC.
When the attacker does not have the knowledge of the fusion rule K used at the FC,
from an attacker’s perspective, maximizing its local probability of error Pe is the optimal
attacking strategy. The optimal attacking strategy in this case is either of the three possibilities:
(P1,0, P0,1) = (0, 1) or (1, 0) or (1, 1) (see Table II). However, the FC has knowledge of the
attacking strategy (α, P1,0, P0,1) and thus, uses the optimal fusion rule as given in (37) and (39).
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered the problem of distributed Bayesian detection with Byzantine data, and char-
acterized the power of attack analytically. For distributed detection for a binary hypothesis
testing problem, the expression for the minimum attacking power above which the ability to
detect is completely destroyed was obtained. We showed that when there are more than 50% of
Byzantines in the network, the data fusion scheme becomes blind and no detector can achieve
any performance gain over the one based just on priors. The optimal attacking strategies for
Byzantines that degrade the performance at the FC were obtained. It was shown that the results
obtained for the non-asymptotic case are consistent with the results obtained for the asymptotic
case only when the FC has the knowledge of the attacker’s strategies, and thus, uses the optimal
fusion rule. However, results obtained for the non-asymptotic case, when the FC does not have
knowledge of attacker’s strategies, are not the same as the results obtained for the asymptotic
case. There are still many interesting questions that remain to be explored in the future work
such as an analysis of the scenario where Byzantines can also control sensor thresholds used for
making local decisions. Other questions such as the case where Byzantines collude in several
groups (collaborate) to degrade the detection performance can also be investigated.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
> 0
Differentiating both sides of r (P1,0, K∗, α) with respect to P1,0, we get
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
= (K∗ − 1)α
(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
− (N −K∗)α
(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
.
In the following we show that
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
> 0 (48)
i.e., r (P1,0, K∗, α) is non-decreasing. Observe that in the above equation,
(1− Pf )
pi1,0
>
(1− Pd)
pi1,1
. (49)
To show that the above condition is true, we start from the inequality
Pd > Pf (50)
⇔ Pd
1− Pd >
Pf
1− Pf (51)
⇔ αP1,0 + (1− P0,1α) Pd
1− Pd > αP1,0 + (1− P0,1α)
Pf
1− Pf (52)
⇔ αP1,0(1− Pd) + Pd(1− P0,1α)
(1− Pd) >
αP1,0(1− Pf ) + Pf (1− P0,1α)
(1− Pf ) (53)
⇔ pi1,1
(1− Pd) >
pi1,0
(1− Pf ) (54)
⇔ (1− Pf )
pi1,0
>
(1− Pd)
pi1,1
(55)
Similarly, it can be shown that
1− pi1,1
1− Pd >
1− pi1,0
1− Pf (56)
Now from (49) and (56), to show that
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
> 0 is equivalent to show that
(K∗ − 1)
(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
> (N −K∗)
(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
(57)
Next, we consider two different cases, first when there are odd number of nodes in the network
and second when there are even number of nodes in the network.
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Odd Number of Nodes: When there are odd number of nodes in the network, the majority
fusion rule is K∗ = (N + 1)/2. In this case (57) is equivalent to show that(
N − 1
2
)(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
>
(
N − 1
2
)(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
. (58)
To show that the above condition is true, we start from the following inequality
(1− pi1,0)(1− pi1,1)
pi1,0pi1,1
> −1
⇔
[
1
pi1,0
− 1
pi1,1
]
>
[
1
1− pi1,0 −
1
1− pi1,1
]
⇔
[
1
pi1,0
− 1
1− pi1,0
]
>
[
1
pi1,1
− 1
1− pi1,1
]
Since
1− Pf
1− Pd > 1, pi1,0 < 0.5 (consequence of our assumption) and N ≥ 2, the above condition
is equivalent to
1− Pf
1− Pd
[
1
pi1,0
− 1
1− pi1,0
]
>
[
1
pi1,1
− 1
1− pi1,1
]
⇔
(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
>
(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
⇔
(
N − 1
2
)(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
>
(
N − 1
2
)(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
(59)
which implies that
dr (P1,0, K
∗, α)
dP1,0
> 0 for odd number of nodes case. Next, we consider the
even number of nodes case.
Even Number of Nodes: Now, we consider the case when there are even number of nodes in
the network and majority fusion rule is given by K∗ =
N
2
+ 1. Condition (57) is equivalent to
show that (
N
2
)(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
>
(
N
2
− 1
)(
1− Pf
1− pi1,0 −
1− Pd
1− pi1,1
)
.
Which follows from the fact that(
N
2
)(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
>
(
N
2
− 1
)(
1− Pf
pi1,0
− 1− Pd
pi1,1
)
and the result given in (58). This completes our proof.
DRAFT
29
APPENDIX B
CALCULATING PARTIAL DERIVATIVE OF PE W.R.T. P1,0
First, we calculate the partial derivative of QF with respect to P1,0. Notice that,
QF =
N∑
i=K∗
 N
i
 (pi1,0)i(1− pi1,0)N−i (60)
where
pi1,0 = α(P1,0(1− Pf ) + (1− P0,1)Pf ) + (1− α)Pf (61)
(pi1,0)
′ = dpi1,0/dP1,0 = α(1− Pf ). (62)
Differentiating both sides of (60) with respect to P1,0, we get
dQF
dP1,0
=
 N
K∗
 (K∗(pi1,0)K∗−1(pi1,0)′(1− pi1,0)N−K∗ − (pi1,0)K∗(N −K∗)(1− pi1,0)N−K∗−1(pi1,0)′)
+
 N
K∗ + 1
 ((K∗ + 1)(pi1,0)K∗(pi1,0)′(1− pi1,0)N−K∗−1 − (pi1,0)K∗+1(N −K∗ − 1)
( 1− pi1,0)N−K∗−2(pi1,0)′) + · · ·+
 N
N
 (N(pi1,0)N−1(pi1,0)′ − 0)
= (pi1,0)
′(pi1,0)K
∗−1(1− pi1,0)N−K∗
[ N
K∗
(K∗ − pi1,0
1− pi1,0 (N −K
∗)
)
+
 N
K∗ + 1
((K∗ + 1) pi1,0
1− pi1,0 − (N −K
∗ − 1)
(
pi1,0
1− pi1,0
)2)
+ · · ·
]
= (pi1,0)
′(pi1,0)K
∗−1(1− pi1,0)N−K∗
[ N
K∗
 (K∗ − pi1,0
1− pi1,0 (N −K
∗))
+
pi1,0
1− pi1,0
 N
K∗ + 1
((K∗ + 1)− (N −K∗ − 1) pi1,0
1− pi1,0
)
+ · · ·
]
= (pi1,0)
′(pi1,0)K
∗−1(1− pi1,0)N−K∗
[ N
K∗
K∗ + [− pi1,0
1− pi1,0
 N
K∗
 (N −K∗)
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+
pi1,0
1− pi1,0
 N
K∗ + 1
 (K∗ + 1)]+ · · ·]
Since,
 N
K∗
 K∗
N
=
 N − 1
K∗ − 1
, the above equation can be written as
dQF
dP1,0
= (pi1,0)
′(pi1,0)K
∗−1(1− pi1,0)N−K∗
[ N − 1
K∗ − 1
N
+
pi1,0
1− pi1,0
{ N
K∗ + 1
 (K∗ + 1)−
 N
K∗
 (N −K∗)}+ · · ·]. (63)
Notice that, for any positive integer t
(
pi1,0
1− pi1,0
)t  N
K∗ + t
 (K∗ + t)−
 N
K∗ + t− 1
 (N −K∗ − t+ 1)
 = 0. (64)
Using the result from (64), (63) can be written as
dQF
dP1,0
= (pi1,0)
′(pi1,0)K
∗−1(1− pi1,0)N−K∗
 N − 1
K∗ − 1
N + pi1,0
1− pi1,0 [0] + · · ·+ [0]

⇔ dQF
dP1,0
= α(1− Pf )N
 N − 1
K∗ − 1
 (pi1,0)K∗−1 (1− pi1,0)N−K∗ .
Similarly, the partial derivative of QD w.r.t. P1,0 can calculated to be
dQD
dP1,0
= α(1− Pd)N
 N − 1
K∗ − 1
 (pi1,1)K∗−1 (1− pi1,1)N−K∗ .
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